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SECONDARY BOYCOTTS IN LABOR DISPUTES*
By JEROME R. HELLERSTEINt
AMERICAN legislation and judicial decision for the past fifty years
disclose a gradual trend toward the recognition of the wisdom and
fiecessity of unionizing American workers and of fixing wages, hours
and working conditions through collective agreements.' Typical of this
development are the Wagner Labor Relations Act and the state labor
relations acts which are based upon the philosophy of the need for union-
ization. 2 The implications of this philosophy require a revision by the
courts of a nineteenth century hostility toward the activities of labor
unions essential to the organization of American workers.3 Presenting
forcefully the collision of the point of view expressed in current legis-
lation and modem judicial thought with outmoded judicial attitudes in
the field of labor law is the treatment by the courts of the so-called
secondary boycott in labor disputes. The entire question has been raised
by the recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Goldfinger
v. Feintuch.4
The word "boycott" is "a term of vague signification, of which no
accurate and exhaustive definition has ever been given."3' "Secondary
boycott" is an equally loose and uncertain label used by courts indis-
* This article was prepared jointly for this JouMAL and the INrmTERNATIOr JUai-
DicAL AssoclrArox BuiLETiN. The substance of the article will appear in 6 I. 3. A.
Bu.L. (Jan., 1938). The author is indebted to Maurice C. Kaplan, Sterling Fellow,
Yale School of Law, for invaluable assistance in the preparation of the article. Further
acknowledgements are due the editors of the International Juridical Association Bulle-
tin, the members of the Yale Juridical Association, and to Mendel Lurie, of the New York
bar, who collected the New York cases and made suggestions for their treatment.
ti Member of New York Bar.
1. See Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of
Collective Bargaining (1937) 50 I-ALv. L. REv. 1071; Vrrr, SuPexLEE.r TO LAIDis,
CASES ONr LABOR LAw (1937) cc. 2, 3.
2. See preambles to the Wagner Act, 49 SrTr. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. 151 (1936)
and the state statutes cited in note 70, infra. See also State Labor Relations Acs (1938)
6 1. J. A. Bu.L. 7.
3: See Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930) 39 YA,= L. J. 682; Brmn, LA=aR
Am THE SHE=Ax Acr (1930); Wirr, THE GovERN mENT n LAror_ Dispurrs (1932)
'assim.
4. New York Ct of App., Dec. 7, 1937. 98 N. Y. L. J., Dec. 24, 1937, p. 2341,
col 1.
5. Hough, J., in Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111, 118 (S. D. N. Y.
1914). "The most casual observation will disclose that scarcely any two courts treat-
ing of the subject formulate the same definition." Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Federa-
tion of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127 (1903). Numerous definitions of "boycott"
are collected in OAx-s, ORGANzIED LABOR AND IhNus.. CoNxcrs (1927) 60 et
seq.; see FRAx:FuRTRm & GratmhE, TnE LoABO INyJucrioN" (1930) 42 ct scq.
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criminately to condemn a wide variety of labor's activities.0 It is par-
ticularly important in the field of labor law, charged as it is with preju-
dice and economic bias, that such loose terminology be abandoned and
that the activities coming before the courts in the so-called secondary
boycott cases be carefully analyzed.'
Our starting point is either: (1) a dispute between an employer and
workers in a plant or their union demanding higher wages, shorter hours,
or better working conditions, or (2) a dispute between an employer
and a union seeking to organize his plant. Negotiations are undertaken,
but the employer refuses to grant the employees' or the union's demands.
The workers or the union turn to their own devices to bring pressure
upon the employer in order to force him to grant their demands. Aside
from resort to the administrative agencies set up by the federal and
state governments to protect and enforce labor's rights,' labor's princi-
pal means of forcing employers to grant demands are to deprive em-
ployers of workers and to prevent employers from selling or receiving
goods, materials or services. To achieve these results workers and unions
employ three principal devices: (1) the strike, (2) picketing, (3) unfair
lists and circulars.
Although the formation of a union and a strike to secure higher wages
were condemned as illegal conspiracies at the opening of the nineteenth
century, the economic changes which transformed this nation from one
of farmers, artisans and merchants into a great industrial country, with
millions of unskilled and semi-skilled workers employed by large and
powerful corporations, have brought in their wake legislative and judicial
6. OAKES, op. cit. sitpra note 5, at 654 et seq.; LANDIS, CASES ON LAIOR LAW
(1934) 408 n.; COMMONS AND ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES or LABOR LEGISLATION (3d ed.
1927) 107-108. Thus, in Goldfinger z,. Feintuch [see text p. 351 infra], Judge Leh-
man, who concurred in holding the picketing involved in the suit lawful, declared it
"is not a 'secondary boycott'"; Judge Rippey concurred in the result only because there
was a finding of "unity of interest" of the parties, without which "the facts would
establish a secondary boycott and would be illegal"; and Judge Hubbs dissentel be-
cause he found "a secondary boycott and I think it is illegal." See also Duplex Print-
ing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 475 et seq. (1921).
7. For studies of the law of "boycott" generally, see Wigmore, Boycott and Kin-
dred Practices As Ground for Damages (1887) 21 Am. L. REV. 509; Reed, Peaceable
Boycotting (1894) 5 Am. Ac. Po. & Soc. Sci. 28; Cooke, Solidarity of Interest as
Basis of Legality of Boycotting (1902) 11 YALE L. J. 153; Wyman, The Law as to
the Boycott (1903) 15 GREEN BAG 208; McWilliams, Evolution of the Law Relating
to Boycotts (1907) 41 Am. L. REv. 336; LAiDLER, BorcoTTs AND THE LABOR STRUGGLE
(1913); Feinberg, New York Law of Secondary Boycott (1936) 6 BRooxLYN L. REV.
209; Legality of Picketing Against a Prodict (1936) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 83; Wor-
MAN, THE BOYCOTT IN AMERIcAN TRADE UNIONS (1916).
8. See WiTT, op. cit. supra note 1, at c. 2.
9. Although public meetings, parades, demonstrations, radio broadcasts and other
forms of appeal are employed, the three devices mentioned are the principal pressures
employed by labor.
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sanction of the privilege of organizing unions and of the strike."° It is
lawful in every state to strike against an employer to secure higher wages,
shorter hours, and better working conditions. 1 With the march of
economic and social events, our courts have come to recognize the im-
portance to the nation's welfare of union organization. They have
generally sanctioned strikes to secure union recognition,2 and a number
of courts in leading industrial states have legalized the strike for a closed
shop.
13
The history of judicial approval of picketing an employer against
whom the employees have a grievance, whether to induce other persons
not to work for the employer or to induce consumers not to trade with
the employer, has paralleled that of the strike, but the development of
the legality of picketing has been somewhat arrested in the courts.1 If
the purpose is to secure higher wages, better conditions, unionization of
the plant or in some states, the closed shop, most courts hold the picketing
legal so long as it is carried on in a peaceable manner, without fraud or
violence or undue obstruction.'
If the strike or unionization campaign is permitted by the laws of the
state, workers may bring pressure upon the employer by resorting to
persuasion and advertisement of their grievances through devices other
than picketing, such as meetings, parades, distribution of leaflets, and
similar devices.' The Supreme Court of the United States has recently
intimated its sympathy for the view which is gradually being recognized,
that peaceable picketing is a form of persuasion which comes within the
guaranty of the constitutional right of freedom of speech.' 7
10. CoMMoNs AND ANDVWn S, op. cit. supra note 6, at 106 et seq.; Sayre, Criminal
Conspiracy (1922) 35 HAv. L. REv. 393.
11. COMMONS AxD ANDREWS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 115; ,Vrm, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 20.
12. In some states picketing is unlawful in the absence of a strike; such decisions
forbid picketing to unionize a plant unless some employees have gone out on strike.
Feller v. Local 144, Int'l Ladies Garment Workers Union, 121 N. J. Eq. 452, 191 Atl.
111 (1936) ; see cases collected in LANDIS, op, cit supra note 6, at 244 n. However, the
tendency of the courts is to permit such picketing. Music Hall Theatre v. Moving
Picture M. 0., 249 Ky. 639, 61 S. NV. (2d) 283 (1933) ; Exchange Bakery & Restaurant,
Inc. v. Rifkdn, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927).
13. National Protective Association v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369
(1902) ; Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912) ; see Lniw's, op.
cit. supra note 6, 310 n., 327 n. A recent summary of cases holding a strike for a
closed shop illegal is to be found in Keith Theatre, Inc. v. Vachon, 134 Me. 392, 187
Atl. 692 (1936).
14. See Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts (1932) 10 No. CD.- L
Ray. 15.
15. Wrrr, op. cit. supra note 3, at 31.
16. See note 57, infra.
17. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937), commented on
in State Anti-Injunction Law Sustained by Supreme Court (1937) 6 L J. A. Buu. 1.
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So far, then, the courts have generally gone in cases where the con-
troversy before the court is confined to the employer and his employees
or a union seeking to organize the employees. Upon this background of
judicial decision, we come to a consideration of our present problems,
raised by the extension of the strike, picketing, unfair lists and other
forms of persuasion to persons other than the immediate employer.
STRIKES
Where workers in a plant have gone out on strike and pickets have
been posted at the factory gates, or an organizing campaign to unionize
a non-union shop is in progress, in some industries the union is able
to call upon its members or unions in allied crafts either to strike against
employers who use the materials produced by the "unfair" employer, or
to refuse to work on jobs in which the "unfair" employer participates,
or to work for employers who deal with the "unfair" employer.18 The
carpenters union, for example, has fought non-union manufacturers of
wood trim and other wood products for over thirty years, through strikes
against building owners and contractors who use the non-union materi-
als.'" Unionization of the manufacturer's wood-workers was deemed
imperative to the existence of the carpenters union since those workers
later displaced union men in the building trades, and .as a result this
competition threatened wage standards in the building trades.
Strikes against intermediate employers to compel the unfair employer
to deal with the union have arisen in three general type-situations.
Non-union Materials in the Same or Related Crafts. A number of
courts have refused to permit the union or workers in the same or related
crafts to protect the standards of their organizations by striking against
"unfair" materials.20 Most of the cases so holding, however, except in
18. For purposes of this article the term "unfair employer" is used to refer to an
employer whose employees are on strike or who operates a non-union plant which a
union is attempting to organize. The goods produced or the services rendered by such
a manufacturer are designated "unfair". The use of these terms is not intended to
categorize the employer, the goods or the services, but merely to identify them with
brevity.
19. See cases cited in OAKES, op. cit. supra note 5, at 673-682.
20. Anderson & Lind Mfg. Co. v. Carpenters District Council, 308 IIl. 488, 139
N. E. 887 (1922); Means Slayton Lumber Co. v. United Brotherhood Carpenters, 156
Ill. App. 327 (1910); Steam Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N. E. 82
(1927); Armstrong Cork Insulation Co. v. Walsh, 177 N. E. 2 (Mass. 1931); Service
Wood Heel Co. v. Mackesy, 199 N. E. 400 (Mass. 1936); Lohse Patent Door Co. v.
Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997 (1908); Booth & Bros. v. Burgess, 72 N. J. Eq.
181, 65 Atl. 226 (1906); Moores v. Bricklayers' Union, 10 Ohio Dec. 645 (1889); Pur-
vis v. Local No. 500, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 214 Pa. St. 348,
63 Atl. 585 (1906); Pacific Typesetting Co. v. Int'l Typographical Union, 125 Wash.
273, 216 Pac. 358 (1923); Huttig v. Fuelle, 143 Fed. 363 (1906); Shine v. Fox Bros.
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Massachusetts, are rather old, and might not be followed today. These
courts concluded that the strike against the purchaser-employer was not
a strike against the non-union materials, but rather a strike against a
neutral by third parties only remotely concerned with the original con-
troversy. But the "neutral" seldom complained in court, and the courts
permitted the initial employer to avail himself of the injury to the pur-
chaser of his materials. The decisions talk in terms of interference
with the "freedom of action" and "right of trade" of the unfair em-
ployer,21 as well as alleged "coercion" and "intimidation" of the pur-
chaser, terms used opprobriously to describe the union's notice to the
purchaser that it will not work on non-union materials. 2
Other courts, however, have seen fit to classify this type of pressure
against the intermediate employer as legal.2 These courts have appre-
Mfg. Co., 156 Fed. 357 (1907); cf. U. S. Y. Raish, 163 Fed. 911 (1903). Irving v.
Joint District Council, 180 Fed. 896 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1910) and Irving v. Neal, 209
Fed. 471 (S. D. N. Y. 1913) applying the New York law, are overruled by Bossert
v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917).
A number of the cases holding strikes against non-union materials illegal were
decided under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.
444 (1921); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Association, 274 U. S. 37
(1927); Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trade Council, 18 F. (2d) 333 (S. D. N. Y.
1927), 23 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), "and 60 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932);
Columbus Heating and Ventilating Co. v. Pittsburgh Bed Trades Council, 17 F. (2d)
806 (XV. D. Pa. 1927); Roe Kwodd Corp. v. Bricklayers' Local Union, 33 F. (2d)
225 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 40 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930);
Int'l Brotherhood Electrical Workers Local No. 134 v. Western Union, 6 F. (2d) 444
(C. C. A. 7th, 1927), aff'd, 46 F. (2d) 736 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931). BEM.sAz., op. cd.
supra note 3, contains an exhaustive study of labor cases arising under the Sherman
Act.
21. Patterson & Co. v. Building Trades Council, 11 Pa. Dist. 500 (1902); Lohse
Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. NV. 997 (1903); Booth & Bros. v.
Burgess, 72 N. J. Eq. 181, 65 AUt. 226 (1906).
22. Where a strike is effective enough to stop a manufacturer's operations, he will
often attempt to transfer his work to another manufacturer in order to carry on his
business. The latter's employees, who may be in the same union as the worker on
strike, refuse to aid in breaking the strike at the other, plant and to act as "scabs" to
their own union. Although an injunction against refusal to work on such good. in
effect requires members of a union to break the strilke of their fellow union members,
some courts have granted injunctions in such cases. Piano & Organ Workers v. Piano
Co., 128 IlL App. 353 (1906); Schlang v. Ladies Waist Makers Union, 67 Misc. 221,
124 N. Y. Supp. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union, 232 Ill.
424, 83 N. E. 940 (1908). Other courts recognized that to restrain such a strike is to
force workers to become strike breakers, taking over the jobs of members of their
own union or occupation. Iron Molders Union v. Allis Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45
(C. C. A. 7th, 1908); Searle Mfg. Co. v. Terry, 56 Misc. 265, 106 N. Y. Supp. 438
(Sup. Ct. 1905).
23. Meier v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. NV. 988 (1910) ; Parkinson v. Bldg. Trades
Council, 154 Calif. 581, 98 Pac. 1027 (1903) ; Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N.E.
582 (1917) ; Wilson & Adams v. Pearce, 264 N. Y. 521, 191 N. _. 545 (1934) ; State
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ciated the fact that the close intertwinings of economic relations in
modern industry have created an intimate unity of interest between mem-
bers of the same union or of different unions in the same or related
crafts which was unknown to the small, self-contained units of an earlier
economy. Mr. Justice Brandeis stated the proposition in his dissenting
opinion in Bedford Cut Stone Company v. Journeymen Stone Cutters
Association:
"Members of the Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association could
not work anywhere on stone which had been cut at the quarries by
'men working in opposition' to it without aiding and abetting the
enemy. Observance by each member of the provision of their con-
stitution which forbids such action was essential to his own self
protection." 24
Strikes Against Intermediate Employer Because of the Presence of
Non-union Contractor on the Job. In an industrial union, such as the
United Mine Workers of America, composed of all workers in the in-
dustry regardless of craft, it is not uncommon for the entire membership
of the union employed on the job to strike because one specific craft has
a grievance with the employer. In this situation, the right to strike is
not even questioned. But when the industry is divided into labor groups
on a craft basis, as in the building trades, intercraft cooperation en-
counters the symbol of the "sympathetic strike", from which many courts
have recoiled. The painters, for example, may have a grievance against
their subcontractor. Bricklayers and other craftsmen employed on the
same building strike against the general contractor and the owner to
induce them to bring pressure upon the subcontractor-master-painter to
settle the dispute. The division of workers into craft unions should not
obscure the direct interest which each craft has in the unionization of
other employees, working by its side on the same job. A practice per-
mitted in an industrial union should not be condemned simply because
of a different form of union organization of the employees. 25 A majority
of the courts faced with this problem have permitted such strikes.2
v. Van Pelt, 136 N. C. 633, 49 S. E. 177 (1904); Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214
Fed. 111 (S. D. N. Y. 1914); National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Ass'n,
169 Fed. 259 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909); Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 27 F. (2d) 560 (1928),
aft'd, 29 F. (2d) 679 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), but after hearing final injunction ordered in
40 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
24. 274 U. S. 37, at 64-65 (1927).
25. Cf. In Matter of Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, National Labor
Relations Board, November 22, 1937.
26. Grant Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Bldg. Trades Council, 136 Minn. 167, 161 N. W.
520 (1917) ; Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers, etc., Local, 92 Conn. 161, 101 Atl.
659 (1917) ; Jetton-Delke Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907) ; Meler
v. Speer, 96 Ark. 618, 132 S. W. 988 (1910); Seymour Ruff & Sons, Inc. v. Brick-
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The degree of alliance between unions in different crafts necessary to
justify cooperation in aid of a specific craft has not been authoritatively
spelled out in those jurisdictiens sanctioning intercraft cooperation.
Undoubtedly, with due recognition of the inter-relationships and increas-
ing inter-dependence of the units in a highly industrialized economy,
there is a growing tendency to broaden the conception of the interest
sufficient to justify collective action by labor unions. The New York
courts have been in the vanguard in permitting increasingly ecxpansive
cooperative activity. In Willson & Adams Co. v. Pearcem building
trades unions joined with teamsters unions in refusing to work on ma-
terials transported to the job by non-union teamsters. In sanctioning
the strikes of the building trades unions the court found loading in the
supply yard and unloading at the point where the building was being
constructed must be held to be "a necessary part of the construction"' 2
work. Dock workers on the piers of New York City, organized in craft
unions of longshoremen, checkers, weighers, clerks and others, and
federated in the Transportation Trades Council, have from time to time
united to aid the truck drivers' and teamsters' unions by refusing to
handle goods delivered to the piers by non-union truck-men. In 1935, the
Court of Appeals upheld the refusal to handle goods delivered by non-
union trucks as far as New York law was concerned, and referred the
case to the United States Shipping Board to determine whether any
Federal statute had been violated."9
layers, etc., Union, 163 Md. 587, 164 Atl. 752 (1933); Levering & Garrigues Co. v.
Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) (involving Norris-LaGuardia Act).
Other courts have held strikes because of the presence of a non-union contractor
on the job illegal. Blandford v. Duthie, 147 Md. 388, 128 AtL 133 (1925); Lehigh
Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic Smelting & Refining Works, 92 N. J. Eq. 131, 111 At.
376 (1920); Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, 227 Mass. 382, 116 N. E. 801 (1917);
Central Metal Products v. O'Brien, 278 Fed. 827 (N. D. Ohio 1922); cf. McFarland
Co. v. O'Brien, 6 F. (2d) 1016 (D. C. N. D. Ohio, 1925); R. R. Kitchen & Co. v.
Local Union, 91 IV. Va. 65, 112 S. E. 198 (1922). Many of these cases turn on induc-
ing breach of contract.
27. 240 App. Div. 718, 265 N. Y. Supp. 624 (2d Dep't 1933), aff'd, 264 N. Y. 521,
191 N. E. 545 (1934).
28. 240 App. Div., at 719, 265 N. Y. Supp. at 625.
29. New York Lumber Trade Ass'n v. Lacey, 269 N. Y. 595, 199 N. E. 63 (1935),
cert. denied, 298 U. S. 684 (1936). Previously two Appellate Division decisions (Rear-
don v. Caton, 189 App. Div. 501, 178 N. Y. Supp. 713 (2d Dep't 1919) and Rcardon v.
International Mercantile, 189 App. Div. 515, 178 N. Y. Supp. 722 (2d Dep't 1919)] relied
on Bossert v. Dhuy [221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917)] to sustain the refusal to
handle goods delivered by non-union trucks. In the following year, such a boycott was
enjoined in another Appellate Division decision as a violation of the United States
Shipping Act and the common law obligation of a carrier to serve the public without
discrimination. Burgess Bros. v. Stewart, 112 Misc. 347, 184 N. Y. Supp. 199 (Sup.
Ct 1920), aff'd, 194 App. Div. 913, 185 N. Y. Supp. 85 (2d Dep't 1920). In Buyer v.
Guillan, 271 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921), arising out of the same activities, an injunc-
tion was issued on the basis of a violation of the Sherman Act.
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Strikes Against Intermediate Emplover By Workers in Unrelated
Crafts. The outside limit of inter-union cooperation permitted by the
New York Courts is indicated by Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell."
After the Auburn Draying Company of Auburn, New York, had refused
to accept the closed shop, the Teamster's Union placed it on the "unfair"
list of the city's Central Labor Union. The Central Labor Union adopted
an aggressive policy of inducing the Draying Company's customers to
withdraw their patronage by threatening strikes of union employees and
loss of patronage. The customers included such diverse groups as meat
packers, butchers, bakers, ice dealers, lumber dealers, contractors, and
plumbers. The Court of Appeals condemned the broad scope of the
union's actions:
" .. .the contest did not arise because members of Union No.
679, or members of the same occupation and of other unions, chose
not to work for the plaintiff or for or with men who did engage
in business with it, or sought to persuade, in an orderly and proper
manner, persons, generally, to abstain from business with it . . .
It arose because the defendants, constituting the entire union popu-
lation of the City of Auburn, inaugurated and carried on, affirma-
tively and aggressively, through the agencies of fear and coercion,
a comprehensive exclusion of the plaintiff from the business of the
community, in order to compel it to unionize its business." 31
Subsequent decisions, sanctioning dockworkers and building trade
unions' cooperation in aid of teamsters, have regarded transportation
workers as a part of the industries they serve.32 Whatever vitality the
Auburn decision retains, rests not upon any industrial distinction between
transportation workers and those receiving their products, but upon the
comprehensiveness of the exclusion in that case. The decision stands as
a warning that a united front of various labor unions will not be toler-
ated unless there is a nexus betweeh the unions; and the advantage to
all unions of strong, well organized unions in other industries is an
insufficient link. A more immediate connection, such as direct dealings
with employees of the unfair manufacturer or contractor, or the use
The Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Act were both employed as the
basis of injunctions in the Pullman Strike of 1893 to restrain members of the American
Railway Union from striking against railroads which used Pullman cars. Thomas v.
Cinn., etc., Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 803 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1894); In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564
(1895); cf. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 34 Fed, 481
(C. C. S. D. Iowa 1888). Under the Sherman Act the Supreme Court sharply re-
stricted interstate cooperation even among members of the same union. See Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37 (1927); Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921).
30. 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919).
31. Id., at 11, 124 N. E. at 100.
32. Willson and Adams v. Pearce, 240 App. Div. 718, 265 N. Y. Supp. 624 (2d Dep't
1933); N. Y. Lumber Trade Ass'n v. Lacey, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919).
[Vol. 47: 341
19381 SECONDARY BOYCOTTS IN LABOR DISPUTES 349
on the job of the products of the unfair employer, which makes workers
in different occupations involuntary allies of the unfair employer in
fighting the strikers or the union, warrants the strike of the employees
of the intermediate employer.
PICKETING UNFAIR EMPLOYER'S CUSTOMERS OR SUPPLIERS
We now turn to the use of picketing to induce persons not to buy
or use the products or services of an employer with whom workers or
a union are engaged in a labor dispute, or to induce persons not to supply
goods or services to such an employer.
Only four cases of picketing a distributor of the "unfair" manu-
facturer's products have been found in the reported cases outside of
New York.33 These cases condemn such picketing, but they are rather
old and two of them were decided by nisi prius courts. In view of the
rapid changes which labor law is undergoing, they may be misleading
in reflecting the particular jurisdiction's views today. All the relatively
recent decisions come from New York where the courts have been much
more hospitable to picketing. Most of the lower New York decisions
have turned on variations in the scope of the picket's appeal to the public;
if the banners are considered to be directed merely against the unfair
product, the picketing will be permitted, but if the retailer himself is
called "unfair," and the public is asked nor to patronize him, the courts
generally have enjoined the picketing.
Pickets Carrying Banners Asking Consumcrs Not to Buy Unfair
Products or Use Unfair Services. In this group of cases the pickets'
banners request potential purchasers not to buy the products of the offend-
ing employer; no mention is made of the retailer. The union is merely
following the employer's goods to the place of sale and is there appealing
to consumers not to buy the products of the "unfair" employer. The
New York courts have consistently held this type of picketing lawful.'
33. Meyer Packing Co. v. Butchers' Union, 18 Ohio N. P. (iis.) 457 (1917);
Brace Bros. v. Evans, 5 Pa. Co. 163 (1888); Fink & Son v. Butchers Union No. 422,
84 N. J. Eq. 638, 95 AtI. 182 (1915) ; Parker Paint & Vail Paper Co. v. Local Union
No. 813, 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S. E. 911 (1921).
34. Public Baking Co. v. Stern, 127 Misc. 229, 215 N. Y. Supp. 537 (Sup. Ct.
1926), aff'd, 216 App. Div. 831, 215 N. Y. Supp. 908 (1st Dep't 1926); Engelmeyer v.
Simon, 148 Misc. 621, 265 N. Y. Supp. 636 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ; Pechter Baking Co., Inc.
v. Raimist, N. Y. L. J. June 29, 1927; Kronowitz v. Schlansky, 92 N. Y. L. J., July 13,
1934; Abbott Bread Co., Inc. v. Schlansky, 92 N. Y. L. J., Aug. 28, 1934; Harry's
Foods, Inc. v. Schlansky, 92 N. Y. L. J., Nov. 8, 1934. But see Seubert v. Reiff,
98 Misc. 402, 164 N. Y. Supp. 522 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
There is another group of cases involving banners which vary somewhat from those
under discussion. They generally specifically name the retailer or refer to the store
(whereas the first type does not mention the retailer's name) and they usually state that
the store sells non-union goods. Frequently the plea to "buy union made goods" is added.
Prior to the GoIdfinger case, some courts held such picketing illegal. Spanier Window
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These decisions are sound. Admittedly, workers have a right to tell the
story of their strike and working conditions to fellow workers and the
public, and unions have a right to publicize their organizing campaign.
The retail store or other point of distribution of goods or services is a
logical and effective place to appeal to consumers because there the con-
sumers are to be found. The retailer cannot properly object on the
ground that his sales of unfair goods are being curtailed, because the
workers through various other advertising devices may undoubtedly seek
to induce customers not to buy these goods.
The objection of the retailer is that consumers may refuse to buy
other goods or services from him because of the presence of the picket.
There is a likelihood that some consumers sympathetic to labor will refuse
to patronize a retailer who is known to sell some non-union goods. That is
true whether the consumers learn of this fact through a sign carried by
a picket in front of the store or through an announcement made at a
public meeting, which is clearly legal. If consumers who knew that a
retailer sells unfair goods would refuse to patronize him, is there any
justification for interfering with the consumers' being told the truth?
The direction of the law is to widen the opportunity for consumers
to secure the true facts about goods they buy. Pure food and drug
legislation increasingly requires disclosure of facts which may be harm-
ful to the vendor.3" Advertisers are required to disclose more and nfiore
facts to avoid unfair trade practice proceedings by the Federal Trade
Commission.36 The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 require publication of elaborate data, which seriously inter-
feres with the cavalier fashion of selling securities in vogue prior to
the securities legislation.3 7 Why then should a disclosure of the indus-
trial conditions under which goods are manufactured be prohibited
because it may result in inducing consumers not to deal with a vendor
of such goods? A consumer's guide publication which gives information
concerning the labor conditions under which goods are produced has
obtained 50,000 subscribers in the first year and a half of its existence.3 8
Apparently some consumers are affected in their purchases by such facts.
To deprive workers of the opportunity to appeal to consumers at the
most effective locus of persuasion, the retail outlet, would be a severe
blow to labor. There appears to be no justification for cutting off this
Cleaning Co. v. Awerkin, 228 App. Div. 617, 232 N. Y. Supp. 886 (1928). Such a banner
was used and held permissible in the Goldfinger case. There is no proper basis for
distinguishing between this type of banner and the banner which does not mention the
retailer's name. In both cases some consumers may refuse to buy any goods from the
retailer, but no appeal for general withdrawal of patronage is made in either case.
35. See BLANCK, FOODS AND THE LAW (1935).
36. HENDERSOiN, THE FEDERAL TRADE Co IsSION (1924).
37. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. §§ 77-78 (1936).
38. 2 Consumers Union Reports (1937) no. 10, at 2.
[Vol. 47 : 341
1938] SECONDARY BOYCOTTS IN LABOR DISPUTES 351
important type of appeal to consumers. That is the view adopted by the
New York Court of Appeals in Goldfinger v. Feintuch.
In that case the "Butchers' Union, Local 174, which had contracts with
every other manufacturer of kosher meat products in New York City,
attempted to obtain a union agreement from W. & I. Blumenthal, manu-
facturers of Ukor products. The Blumenthals paid wages ranging from
50 to 75 cents an hour, while the union scale was from 95 cents to
$1.25 an hour. The union sought to bring pressure on the Blumenthals
by placing pickets in front of retail stores selling the manufacturers'
products, including among these the plaintiff's delicatessen store. These
pickets carried signs which read: "This store sells delicatessen that is
made in a non-union factory" and "Ukor provision company is unfair
to union labor. Please buy union-made delicatessen only."
W. & I. Blumenthal at first brought suit to enjoin the picketing, but
its application was denied on the ground that the union had "a right
to appeal to the public not to buy non-union goods."4 The Blumenthals
thereupon changed their attorneys and brought another suit to enjoin
the picketing.4 Again the injunction was denied, Justice McGeehan
wrote:
"Picketing is not illegal because of the place where it is carried
on. Where can the union better urge people not to buy non-union
goods than the place where non-union goods are sold? There is
nothing illegal in that. If the consumer draws the inference that
the seller of non-union goods is either hostile or indifferent to the
objects of the union, why is not that a true inference?"' 42
Undaunted by these rebuffs, the Blumenthals induced Goldfinger, a
delicatessen store proprietor who sold Ukor as well as other meat products,
to bring suit in his name The injunction was denied in a notable opinion
by Justice Collins.43 The Appellate Division reversed the decision with-
out opinion and ordered the issuance of an injunction.4" The Court of
Appeals modified the Appellate Division's order by limiting the in-
junction to restraints of violence and intimidation but permitting the
picketing.45
39. 98 N. Y. L. J., Dec. 24, 1937, p. 2341, col. 1.
40. Blumenthal v. Feintuch, 153 Misc. 40, 273 N. Y. Supp. 660 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
41. See brief for defendant in Goldfinger case, mpra, note 39.
42. Blumenthal v. Weikman, 154 Misc. 684, 277 N. Y. Supp. 895 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
43. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 159 Misc. 806, 288 N. Y. Supp. 855 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
44. 250 App. Div. 751, 295 N. Y. Supp. 753 (Ist Dep't 1937) (Justices McAvoy
and Glennon dissented).
45. Judge Finch's opinion for the Court of Appeals begins with a broadside against
certain types of illegal picketing which were not involved in the case, but which have
been much publicized recently by New York newspapers. This has already had reper-
cussions in unusually severe sentences meted out to pickets by New York city magis-
trates. See N. Y. Times, December 18, 1937.
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The court declared in its opinion that it is illegal to picket the place
of business of a retailer "not himself a party to an industrial dispute"
to persuade the public to withdraw its patronage generally from the
business- an issue not, however, before the court on the facts of the
case. The court proceeded:
"Within the limits of peaceful picketing, however, picketing may
be carried on not only against the manufacturer, but against a non-
union product sold by one in unity of interest with the manufacturer
who is in the same business for profit.
"Where a manufacturer pays less than union wages, both it and the
retailers who sell its products are in a position to undersell coin-
petitors who pay the higher scale and this may result in unfair
reduction of the wages of union members. Concededly the defend-
ant union would be entitled to picket peacefully the plant of the
manufacturer.
"Where the manufacturer disposes of the product through retailers
in unity of interest with it, unless the union may follow the product
to the place where it is sold and peacefully ask the public to refrain
from purchasing it, the union would be deprived of a fair and proper
means of bringing its plea to the attention of the public."' 40
This result seems necessary for any court which gives more than lip
service to the oft repeated judicial declaration that persons suffering as
a result of the exercise by workers and labor unions of their privilege
of appealing to the public for support have no recourse against labor.
Any hurt thereby done to the retailer or other distributor must be marked
off the legal balance sheet as damnum absque injuria.4 7
The question arises as to whether the result should be different in a
case where the employer involved in the original controversy renders
services or supplies goods or equipment which the retailer or other middle
man uses in his business, instead of goods which the latter sells. For
example, may the striking employees of a drug manufacturer or a union
46. The court relies upon the analogous cases holding strikes against non-union
products by cooperating unions lawful. See Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117
N. E. 582 (1917); Wilson & Adams v. Pearce, 264 N. Y. 521, 191 N. E. 545 (1934);
New York Lumber Trade Association v. Lacey, 269 N. Y. 595, 199 N. E. 688 (1935).
The court also holds that the state anti-injunction act applies to the case, a feature of the
opinion which is discussed on pp. 365, 367, infra. Judge Lehman concurred, taking
the position that there was no basis for an injunction of any kind. Judge Rippey con-
curred in the result and wrote: "I concur in the result reached solely upon the ground
that the trial court found upon sufficient evidence that there was complete unity of
interest between the plaintiff and the manufacturer. Except for the finding of unity
of interest, the facts would establish a secondary boycott and would be illegal ...
I cannot agree that the plaintiff and the manufacturer were engaged in the same
trade or industry." Judge Hubbs dissented on the ground that an illegal secondary
boycott had been shown to exist.
47. See Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927); Per-
fect Laundry Co. v. Marsh, 120 N. J. Eq. 508, 186 Atl. 470 (1936).
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seeking to organize the employees of the manufacturer place pickets in
front of a beauty parlor and urge consumers not to have their hair
rinsed with Jones' non-union henna rinse? If the American Newspaper
Guild has called a strike, or is seeking to organize a newspaper, may
reporters picket an advertiser urging consumers not to buy goods adver-
tised in the newspaper?4 The union is asking consumers in the first
case to refrain from accepting the use of materials provided by an unfair
employer and, in the second case, to make valueless the services pro-
vided by an unfair employer. There is no sound reason for a distinction
between an appeal to refuse to buy goods manufactured by the unfair
employer and a refusal to use materials or equipment employed in services
received by the consumer (i.e., the henna in the rinse) or non-union
services used in securing the consumer's trade (i.e., the newspaper adver-
tisement). In each case the consumer is requested not to purchase or
make use of the products or services of the unfair employer; the strikers
or union members are not urging a general withdrawal of trade from
the vendor or user of the unfair employer's products or services. Picket-
ing to accomplish such a refusal to use the materials, equipment, or
services of an unfair employer falls within the principles of Goldfilzger
v. Feintuch and should be held legal.4 9
48. See note 100, infra, for such cases arising under the New York anti-injunc-
tion act.
49. A number of cases have arisen as a result of the attempt of Window Clearers
Union Local No. 2 to unionize the window cleaning industry and to raise the level
of wages of window cleaners working for about $25.00 a week to the union scale of
$38.00 a week. In all of the following cases picketing at the store or other place
where the window cleaning was being done was permitted, but only with banners which
did not mention the retailer's name. Spanier 'Window Cleaning Co. ,. Awerkin, 228
App. Div. 617, 232 N. Y. Supp. 886 (1st Dep't 1928); Tri-Boro Window Cleaning Co.,
Inc. v. Krat, 241 App. Div. 799, 270 N. Y. Supp. 921 (1934); Witzer v. Window
Cleaners Protective Union, Local No. 2, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 10, 1934, p. 156, col. 2. In some
cases the courts enjoined the use of banners which named or designated the retailer.
Spanier Window Cleaning Co. v. Awerkin, mipra. In other cases, where the retailer
was named, the picketing was enjoined entirely. Commercial House & Window Clean-
ing Co. v. Amerkin, 138 Misc. 512, 240 N. Y. Supp. 797 (Sup. Ct. 1930), aff'd, 226 App.
Div. 734 (1929) ; National House Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. Bobaluc, 243 App. Div.
699, 277 N. Y. Supp. 966 (1st Dep't 1935) (the action was instituted before the anti-
injunction act became effective and the court held it inapplicable for that reason);
cf. Picker v. Empire Individual Window Cleaning Contractors Union, Inc., N. Y. L J.,
Oct. 9, 1937.
Insofar as the signs make no appeal to consumers not to patronize the retailer, there
should be no doubt of the legality of the picketing. The window cleaners are picketing
at the most effective and dramatic place of appeal, where the work is being done. The
picketing may induce the non-union window cleaners to join the strike or the retailer
to hiie another window cleaner, wholly without reference to pressure of withdrawal of
trade from the retailer which may incidentally result. Where the pickets ask consum-
ers not to patronize the retailers or other distributors who use unfair services, the argu-
ments -made in favor of allowing picketing of a retailer who buys unfair goods are
applicabli.
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Pickets Requesting Consumers Not to Deal With the Unfair En-
ployer's Customers. In this group of cases the pickets and their banners
ask consumers not to buy any goods from the person being picketed or
not to employ any of his services because he deals in some particular with
the unfair employer. The New York Court of Appeals condemned pick-
eting of this nature in a strong dictum in the Goldfinger case. Is there
any justification for this conclusion?
The retailer or other merchant being picketed usually pleads that he
has no quarrel with his employees, that he is an innocent neutral being
crushed in a labor dispute to which he is no party, and that he is power-
less to control the action of the manufacturer or pickets. But a retailer
who buys goods from a non-union manufacturer, whose employees are
paid low wages, is likely to have an advantage of lower prices over his
competitor who purchases from a union manufacturer operating and
paying higher wages. To that extent the retailer is a party to the spoils
of the working conditions against which the primary employer's workers
are striking." Retailers or other distributors who buy goods from an
unfair employer or who avail themselves of serices rendered by an
unfair employer cannot be neutral. So long as the retailer continues to
buy such unfair goods or to use such unfair services he is necessarily
an ally of the unfair employer. If he stops buying the unfair goods or
utilizing the unfair services of the employer, he becomes an ally of the
strikers or the union. Neutrality is impossible. The bargaining power
of the union or the strikers depends largely upon their ability to exert
effective economic pressure. The strikers or the union, as the case may
be, may therefore properly contend that they have a clear cut and serious
grievance against the retailer or other person dealing with the unfair
employer.
The retailer's plea that he is powerless to control the unfair manu-
facturer's conduct of his relations with his employees is not altogether
sound. As a practical matter retailers exercise a very considerable degree
of control over the granting or denying by the manufacturer of the
strikers' or the union's demands. When the pressure of a withdrawal of
patronage by consumers makes itself felt upon retailers, they in turn
bring pressure upon the manufacturer to settle the strike. True, a par-
ticular retailer may be unable to induce the manufacturer to settle the
strike, but strikers and the union picket numerous retailers, and if suffi-
cient pressure can be brought to bear upon groups of retailers, the pres-
sure on the employer will be great indeed and may be decisive.
The retailer's contention that as an individual he is helpless to satisfy
demands made upon him by the strikers or the union is contrary to fact.
If the retailer agrees to buy no more products or to avail himself of no
50. The court recognizes this factor in its opinion in the Goldfinger case.
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further services of the unfair employer until the strike has been settled,
or the unionizing campaign is completed, the picket line around his store
will be withdrawn at once. So long as the retailer, whether motivated by
a desire for pecuniary profit, hostility to labor unions, or for any other
reason, chooses to continue to buy the unfair goods or use the unfair
services and thereby remain an ally of the unfair employer in the labor
struggle, the strikers should be permitted to advertise that fact to the
community and to urge consumers to cease dealing with him.
An important practical feature of the problem, which is ordinarily
overlooked, is the fact that employers frequently exercise similar pressure
in labor disputes. Although there are statutes in most states forbidding
blacklisting of workers, students of the subject report that the statutes
are a "dead letter" and that leaders in labor union activities frequently
find themselves barred for life from an entire industry through the ex-
change of blacklists by employers.5' Wholly apart from the question of
whether it is lawful for a manufacturer to Urge members of his trade
association to refuse to sell goods to a retailer who cancels his orders
when the manufacturer's employees are on strike or a union is seeking
to organize the factory,52 there are other highly important practical
weapons in the employer's hands through which he may bring pressure
on so-called "neutrals" to aid him in his attempts to break strikes or
unionizing campaigns. A newspaper takes a position sympathetic to the
strikers or the union. The employer not only cuts off his own advertising
but ufges other advertisers to withdraw their advertisements from the
paper.5 3 It is difficult to overestimate the highly important role of the
press in strikes and in union organization drives, particularly where the
strikers or the union must rely upon an appeal to consumers in order
to affect the employer. Banks may be warned by employers that if they
do not call demand loans made to persons sympathetic to the strikers,
important accounts will be dosed. Teachers who aid the strikers' cause
may be dismissed through the efforts of the employer. These are daily
practices in labor disputes, and the instances given are little more than
a suggestion of the widespread and far reaching pressures upon persons
not directly involved in the labor disputes which are exercised by em-
51. See Magruder, supra note 1, at 1084, n. 50; ConyONs & Almaimws, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 123-124; Governumtal Protection of Labor's Right to Organriz, N. L. R. B,
Div. oF EcoN. REs. (1936) no. 1, at 13.
52. Cf. Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen 499 (Mass. 1867); McCarter v. Baltimore
Chamber of Commerce, 126 Md. 131, 94 AUt. 541 (1915); Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis,
54 Minn. 223, 55 N. W. 1119 (1893); see LAxDIs, op. dt. supra note 6, at 418 n.;
Wigmore, loc. cit supra note 7.
53. Illustrations of control over intermediate parties by employers are cited by
LAmixE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 307 et seq. For cases of radio censorship of strike
news and speeches favorable to labor unions, see KAssN'R & ZACnAI0FO, RAtio Is Cmn-
soam (1936) 19, 53.
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ployers. 4 If our purpose is to achieve collective bargaining upon anything
like a basis of equality, 5 should not workers, in view of these powerful
weapons available to employers, at least be permitted the entirely open
and honest attempt to induce consumers not to deal with the employer
who buys unfair goods or uses unfair services ?oo
Effect of Contracts with Unfair Employer. Retailers or other dis-
tributors sometimes have contracts requiring them to purchase goods
from manufacturers. Should the legality of the picketing of the retailer
or other distributor be affected by the existence of such contracts? The
problem has arisen in the analogous case of picketing to secure union
recognition where the employer is under contract to deal exclusively
with a rival union. In Stillwell Theatre v. Kaplan 7 the New York
Court of Appeals held such picketing lawful. The salutary philosophy
of keeping judicial hands off labor disputes, so long as the parties con-
duct themselves peaceably, was expressed by the court as follows:
"The Court of Appeals has for many years been disposed to leave
parties to peaceful labor disputes unmolested when economic rather
than legal questions are involved . . . The collateral result of the
attempted persuasion of the public not to patronize the theatre
while it employed members of the rival union might make it un-
profitable for the employer to go on with the contract, but to state
54. Jersey City affords an illuminating example of cooperation between local officials
and anti-union employers to keep out unions. Labor unions find difficulty in securing
public halls in which to hold meetings; this is effected through the denial or threat of
denial by police of permits for the meetings. See REPORT ON THE DENIAL oF LABOR AND
CIVIL RIGHTS IN HUDSON COUNTY, NEW JERSEY, NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF
POLITICAL PRISONERS (1937). Attempts by representatives of the Committee for Indus-
trial Organization to distribute leaflets have been met with arrests and expulsions from
Jersey City, where Mayor Hague, who recently declared, "I am the law", reigns. See
(1937) 93 NEW REPUBLIC 155. See also Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 421, n. 102.
In company towns the indirect economic pressure is a particularly powerful weapon.
since the employer controls virtually every part of the town's economic life. See Ma-
gruder, supra note 1, at 1077.
55. Writing in 1887, John H. Wigmore contended that boycotts by labor should
stand upon the same footing as trade boycotts and be held lawful. He wrote: "All
parties must stand as social units, and this peaceful coercion, if it be granted to one set
of men, must be granted to all, and if it be refused to one class, must be refused to
all." Wigmore, supra note 1, at 525.
56. A variation of the cases last discussed arises when the strikers seek to bring
pressure upon persons selling to the employer or rendering services to him not to deal
with him, rather than upon those buying from the manufacturer or using his services.
If our views, that through picketing or unfair lists workers may appeal to customers
of a retailer, who buys from an unfair manufacturer, to withdraw patronage, are
sound, the same considerations would require a court to hold that the person who sells
products or renders services to the unfair employer may be subjected to the same type
of labor pressure.
57. 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932); The Enforcement of Closed Shop Con-
tracts (1934) 2 I. J. A. BULL. no. 12, p. 7.
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fairly and truly to the public that the conduct of the employer is
socially objectionable to a labor union is no persuasion to break a
contract. This court has never undertaken to restrain such con-
duct, although it has had the opportunity. ' 58
Similarly, in the case of a strike against an intermediate employer
who purchases goods from an unfair employer or uses the services of
an unfair employer, the fact that he is bound by contract with the man-
ufacturer does not alter the legality of the strike." Labor's privilege of
informing consumers that unfair goods or services are being sold or
used by a retailer and urging the public to support labor's attempts to
win union conditions should not be destroyed by contracts made by em-
ployers." Nor can the merchant being picketed complain that the law
affords him no protection. Manufacturers generally protect themselves
against the contingency of strikes by clauses in their contracts relieving
them of their obligations in the event of strikes in their plants. The
same safeguard is generally open to wholesalers, retailers, advertisers and
others to relieve themselves of the obligation to purchase the manufac-
turers' products or to use the unfair employer's services when the latter's
employees are on strike or a unionization campaign is in progress.
"UNFAIR LISTS" AND CIRCULARS TO RETAILERS OR
OTHER DISTRIBUTORS
Unions are everywhere conceded the privilege of withholding the
patronage of their members from an unfair employer and may generally
appeal to the public to withhold its patronage by means of peaceful
verbal appeals, banners, and circulars which do not carry an intimation
that the recipient will likewise be subjected to loss of patronage if he
disregards the appeal." Some courts, however, have paid only lip ser-
vice to this privilege and have construed every request "not to patronize"
or every statement that an employer is "unfair" as an unlawful "threat." '
In finding that unfair lists and circulars to retailers announcing the in-
tention of union members not to patronize retailers who sell unfair goods
or who use unfair services are illegal, 3 these courts have resorted to a
58. Id. at 408, 182 N. . at 65.
59. Cf. note 57, supra.
60. See the discussion of the effects of contracts between an employer and his cus-
tomers in FANmxnuR= & Gasan, TnE LABoR INJuucrIo. (1930) 35, ct seq.
61. Perfect Laundry Co. v. Marsh, 120 N. J. Eq. 508, 186 At. 470 (1936) lists the
authorities; see OAxys, op. cit. supra note 5, at 618, n. 33.
62. Martin v. McFall, 65 N. J. Eq. 91, 55 AtL. 465 (1903) ; Wilson v. Hey, 232 IlL
389, 83 N. E. 928 (1908); Seattle Brewing Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed. 1011 (C. C. N. D.
Col. 1905).
63. State v. Stockford, 77 Conn. 227, 58 Atl. 769 (1904); Wilson v. Hey, 232 I11.
389, 83 N. E. 928 (1908) ; My Maryland Lodge v. Adt, 100 Md. 238, 59 AtI. 721 (1905) ;
Beck v. Teamsters Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1893); A. Pink & Son v.
Butchers Union, 84 N. J. Eq. 638, 95 At. 182 (1915); Branson v. L ,V. V., 30 Nev.
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procedure which should provide inviting material for the student of
language and symbolism." The "notice" of an intention not to use unfair
goods or services or to refuse to patronize retailers who sell such goods
or use such services is converted into "coercion," "threats," and "intimi-
dation," catchwords in which courts condense, without twinges of the
judicial conscience, their hostility to the strike or the unions' activity.
The most telling blow to such lists and circulars was struck by the United
States Supreme Court in the famous Danbury Hatters' case, when it
permitted a manufacturer to recover treble damages under the Sherman
Act, a decision which led to the discontinuance of the American Feder-
ation of Labor's use of the "unfair list." 6 Other courts, however, have
taken a more realistic view of these cases and have recognized that a
"threat" to withdraw patronage of unfair goods or services 7 is no less
proper than a withdrawal of the patronage," the validity of which few
270, 95 Pac. 354 (1908); Bellevue Brewing Co. v. United Brewery Workmen, 12 Ohio
N. P. (N. s.) 257 (1911); Brace Bros. v. Evans, 5 Pa. County Ct. Rep. 163 (1888);
Patch Mfg. Co. v. Protection Lodge, No. 215, 77 Vt. 294, 60 Atl. 74 (1905); Crupp
v. Comm., 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E. 620 (1888); Old Dominion Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed,
48 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1887); Oxley Stave Co. v. Cooper's Int'l Union, 72 Fed. 695
(C. C. Kans. 1896), aff'd, 83 Fed. 912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897); Seattle Brewing & Malting
Co. v. Hansen, 144 Fed. 1011 (C. C. N. D. Col., 1905) ; Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. Co.
v. Montana Fed. of Labor, 156 Fed. 809 (C. C. D. Mont., 1907).
64. See the discussion of Symbolism in 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
492 (1934); ARNOLD, SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935).
65. "I respectfully concur on this point with the admirable judgment of Holmes, J.,
in Vegelahn v. Guntner where he remarks that the unlawfulness of 'threats' depends
on what you 'threaten' and of 'compulsion' on how you 'compel' . . . the discussion of
this question would be much more lucid if the disputants would observe certain simple
rules. First, to avoid question-begging epithets, such as 'boycotting', 'ostracism' . . .
'coercion', and the like. Secondly, when they use the word 'maliciously' to say in what
sense they use it . . ." Lord Scrutton in De Freville, Ltd., v. Motor Trade Assoc.
[1921] 3 K. B. 40, at 69. See also Caldwell, J., dissenting in Hopkins v. Oxley Stave
Co., 83 Fed. 912, 924 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897) ; FRANKFURTER & GREENE, op. cit. supra note
5, at 35; cf. Collins, J., in Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 159 Misc. 806, 810, 288 N. Y. S. 855,
860 (1937). "The plaintiff insists that the picketing of his store . . . constitutes coercion
and intimidation. But if to picket a neutral is coercion or intimidation, the picketing
the offending non-union employer would be equally coercive or intimidating."
66. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522
(1915); see also Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911); Loewe
v. Calif. Fed. of Labor, 189 Fed. 714 (C. C. N. D. Calif. 1911); cf. U. S. Gypsum Co.
v. Hyslop, 39 F. (2d) 228 (N. D. Iowa, 1930).
67. "As a general rule, even if subject to some exception, what you may do in a
certain event you may threaten to do-that is, give warning of your intention to do in
that event, and thus allow the other person the chance of avoiding the consequence."
Holmes, J., in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 107, 44 N. E. 1077, 1085 (1896). See
also Payne v. The Western & Atlantic R.R., 13 Lea 507 (Tenn. 1884); National Pro-
tective Association v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902); cf. LAIDLER, op.
cit. supra note 7, at 230-5; FRANKFuRT R & GREENE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 34-35.
68. Truax v. Bisbee Local, 19 Ariz. 379, 171 Pac. 121 (1918); Pierce v, Stable-
men's Union, 156 Calif. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909) ; De Pear v. Cook's Union, 27 CHIcAGo
LEGAL NEWs 785 (Colo. D. Ct. 1895); Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183,
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courts doubt. As for the notice that union men will not patronize the
retailer if he continues to buy unfair goods or to use the services of the
unfair employer, it should be borne in mind that the union is not appeal-
ing to the public generally to withdraw its patronage from the retailers.
These are appeals solely to union men and, in some cases, announcements
to retailers that union men will not patronize persons who sell unfair
goods or who use the services of an unfair employer. Wholly without
reference to the question whether strikers and unions should be permitted
to ask the public generally not to patronize retailers who sell unfair goods
or use unfair services, unions should be able to appeal to other union men,
who have a vital interest in protecting union organizations and wage
scales, not to spend their earnings with retailers who ally themselves with
unfair employers. The decisions permitting unions to urge members of
other crafts to strike on jobs where unfair materials are used afford a
strong analogy for allowing the unfair lists and circulars in questionPa
Nor do we believe the courts are justified in holding illegal notices
appealing to the public generally, and not merely to other union men, to
refuse to patronize merchants who deal in unfair goods or who use un-
fair services. The same considerations which justify the picketing of
retailers with signs urging consumers not to patronize business men who
handle unfair goods or who use unfair services should lead courts to
refuse to interfere with similar appeals by means of circulars.70
EFFECT OF ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTES
After Section 20 of the Clayton Act had been "construed" out of
existence, 71 continued abuse by the courts of the power to enjoin labor's
163 Pac. 107 (1917) ; Marx & Haas Clothing Co. v. Watson, 163 Mo. 133, 67 S. V. 391
(1902). But see Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. NV. 997 (1903);
see also National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902).
69. See notes 23 and 24, mipra. In many of these cases unfair lists were dis-
tributed to builders and contractors. See, e.g., Parkinson v. Building Trades Council,
154 Calif. 581, 98 Pac. 1027 (1908); Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111 (S. D.
N. Y. 1914).
70. That a serious interference with freedom of speech and press is involved by
the courts' curtailment of the distribution of these notices was recognized by sevaral
state courts in decisions refusing to prohibit the activity. Lindsay v. Montana Federa-
tion of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127 (1908) ; Marx & Haas Clothing Co. v. Watson,
168 Mo. 133, 67 S. NV. 391 (1902) ; Riggs v. Cincinnati Waiter's Alliance, 5 Ohio N. P.
386 (1898); cf. Dailey v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 94, 44 Pac. 458 (1896). The Su-
preme Court in Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911) rejected
this view. In view of the broadened scope of the protection afforded freedom of
speech since 1911, the Buck Stove case might not be followed by the Supreme Court
today. See The De Jonge Decision (1937) 5 I. J. A. BUL. 86.
71. The first important attempt to limit the issuance of labor injunctions, through
the enactment of Section 20 of the Clayton Act, proved abortive when the Supreme
Court held that the statute merely reaffirmed existing equity practice, and that it applied
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activities72 led Congress in 1932 to enact the Norris-LaGuardia Injunc-
tion Act, by which the jurisdiction of the federal courts to issue injunc-
tions in labor disputes was sharply limited and the procedure for issuing
such injunctions was carefully regulated. 3 Since that date the legisla-
tures of fourteen states have enacted statutes modelled after the federal
act.74
How do these statutes affect strikes, picketing, unfair lists, and cir-
culars directed against persons other than the immediate unfair em-
ployer? The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person
or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms
are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert" cer-
tain enumerated acts. The acts enumerated include:
"(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in
any relation of employment."
"(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in,
any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or
by any other method not involving fraud or violence."
"(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in pro-
motion of their interests in a labor dispute.1
7 5
The state statutes contain similar provisions."0 In some cases they
specifically forbid injunctions restraining persons singly or in concert
from "ceasing to patronize any person or persons"' 77 and from "peaceful
only to disputes in which the parties bore the relation of employer and employee. Amer-
ican Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921); Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921). These decisions resulted in the
emasculation of state statutes patterned after Section 20 of the Clayton Act. See
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 135 et seq.; BERMAN, op. Cit. supra
note 3, passim.
72. See WirrT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 122 et seq. for references to labor's fight
against injunctions in labor disputes.
73. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. (1936).
74. CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 97, § 78; Idaho Laws 1933, 215; IND.
STAT. ANN. (Bums, 1933) tit. 40, c. 5, §§ 501-514; KAN. GEN. STAT. (1935) c. 60, art. 11,
§ 60-1107; La. Laws 1934, no. 203; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1936) c. 23, §§ 4260-6';
N. Y. C. P. A. § 876-a; N. D. Laws 1935, c. 247; ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) tit. 49,
§§ 49-1904-06; Pa. Laws 1935, no. 303; UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 49-2-8; Wash.
Laws 1937 Spec. Sess., c. 7, § 4; Wis. STAT. (1935) § 193. 60 et seq.; Wyo. Laws 1933,
c. 37, § 3, as amended by Laws of 1937, c. 15. See WITT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 58-59
for references to the materials bearing upon these statutes; Fraenkel, Recent Statutes
Affecting Labor Injunctions and Yellow Dog Contracts (1936) 30 IL. L. REV. 854.
75. 47 STAT. 70 (1932) 29 U. S. C. § 104 (1936) (emphasis added).
76. See statutes, note 70, supra.
77. See Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Utah statutes, note 70, supra.
The Wisconsin statute proscribes orders restraining "ceasing to patronize or employ
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picketing."78 The Pennsylvania statute proscribes injunctions restraining
"persuading by any lawful means other persons to cease patronizing or
contracting or employing or leaving the employ of any person," "ceas-
ing or refusing to work with any person or group of persons" and
"ceasing or refusing to work on any goods, materials, machines or
other commodities." 7  Although the language of the statutes varies
somewhat, they all in effect prohibit injunctions restraining strikes,
picketing, and other forms of persuasion, including distribution of
notices and circulars, urging persons not to work for or patronize an
employer in cases to which the statutes are applicable. These provisions
make no distinction between the initial and intermediate employer, except
for the Wisconsin statute which expressly declares that the act shall
not "legalize a secondary boycott" With this single exception, these
provisions clearly forbid injunctions against all forms of strikes or
peaceful picketing or other peaceful methods of seeking to withdraw
workers, customers, materials or supplies from any employer, whether
initial or intermediate, provided the statute is applicable to the facts of
the case.s°
The statutes are applicable only to cases in which a "labor dispute"
exists, and their protection is confined to "persons participating or in-
terested in a labor dispute." Most of the cases decided under the statutes
have centered around the definitions of a "case involving or growing
out of a labor dispute" and "labor dispute." The term "case involving
or growing out of a labor dispute," as defined by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act and by the state statutes, includes a situation "when the case involves
persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupa-
tion; or have direct or indirect interests therein.""' A "person partici-
pating or interested in" a labor dispute includes a person or association
"if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it is engaged in the
same industry, trade, craft or occupation in which such dispute occurs,
or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or
any person, but nothing herein shall be construed to legalize a secondary boycott.'
iVs. STAT. (1935) § 193.60.
78. Ibid. The Pennsylvania statute uses the word "picketing". Pa. Laws 1935,
no. 308.
79. See note 70, .upra.
80. Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. dcnicd,
293 U. S. 594 (1934). In Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers Local, 6 F. Supp. 164
(F. D. Mich., 1934) the court held that subdivisions (e) and (f) of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act, quoted in text at p. 360 supra, forbid issuance of orders restraining pickets
from urging consumers not to patronize the employer. This interpretation is borne out
by the Senate and House Committee Reports. See I. R. Rep. No. 669, 72nd Cong.,
1st Sess. (1931); Sen. Rep. No. 163, quoted in the Cinderella Theater Co. case, smpra.
81. 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 113 (1936). The New York statute does not
contain the language "or have direct or indirect interests therein." See N. Y. C. P. A.
§ 876-a.
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agent of any association composed in whole or in part of employers or
employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft or occupation." 82 The
statutes provide that "labor dispute" includes "any controversy concern-
ing terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association
or representation of persons negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing,
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless
of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of em-
ployer and employee."'8 3
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin was the first case in which a
Circuit Court of Appeals passed upon the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.84 A struggle had been going on for some years in New York
between the open shop employers' Iron League and the International
Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, which
was attempting to secure a closed shop in the industry. The union noti-
fied builders and contractors that if they employed or sublet work to
members of the Iron League, the union would call strikes on all jobs
being carried on by such builders or contractors and that it would urge
other building trades unions to join in these strikes. The union sent
circulars to builders and contractors and established picket lines announe-.
ing their plan of action. The trial court granted an injunction. The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the order and held that a labor dis-
pute existed between the union (an association of employees) and the
members of the Iron League (an association of employers), which were
engaged in the same industry within the meaning of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act. The Court said:
"Now under the statute, a District Court cannot restrain the
notifying of parties by interested individuals (Section 104(g)) of
an intention to refuse to work; nor can the court prevent, in the
absence of fraud or violence, the giving of publicity to the facts in
the controversy (Section 104(e)) or encouraging others to refuse
to work (Section 104(i)). The fact that the notification and the
publicity will result in coercing the parties informed and cause them
to refrain from contracting with the appellees cannot be taken into
consideration, for the court is without the power to prevent such
notification. The court has not the power or authority to issue an
injunction against these appellants who are engaged in a controversy
arising out of an attempt to establish a closed shop by notifying
82. 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 113. The New York statute does not require
that the persons involved in the litigation be "persons participating or interested in a
labor dispute"; the tests are solely the definition of "labor dispute" and cases involving
or growing out of a labor dispute. Section 876-a, N. Y. C. P. A. Nevertheless the
statute is inapplicable unless the case involves persons who are "engaged in the same
industry, trade, craft or occupation or who are employees of one employer." Ibid.
83. Ibid. (Emphasis added).
84. 71 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 594 (1934).
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general contractors and architects of an intention of members of a
union to refuse to work, nor can these appellees prevent these
appellants from refusing to work or inciting sympathetic strikes."85
Under this case, it is clear that no injunction may be issued by a federal
court to restrain workers engaged in a labor dispute from:
(1) Issuing circulars to other employers engaged in the same industry
and otherwise appealing to them not to deal with the unfair em-
ployer.
(2) Issuing circulars to other employers in the same industry and
otherwise notifying them that if they deal with the unfair em-
ployer, the union will call strikes on all jobs of such employers.
(3) Picketing to appeal to workers in other crafts in the industry to
refuse to work on jobs on which the unfair employer is engaged.
(4) Urging, and threatening to urge, other unions in the same in-
dustry, to refuse to work for an employer who deals with the
unfair employer.
Not all the federal courts have followed the Second Circuit's sym-
pathetic interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has handed down a series of decisions
which so narrows the definition of "labor dispute" that the effect has
been virtual nullification of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.80 These cases
85. 71 F. (2d) 284, 287 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
86. United Electric Coal Co. v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), cert. denied,
297 U. S. 714 (1935), in which the court held that no labor dispute existed because the
relation of employer and employee did not exist between the disputants. This remark-
able conclusion is in complete defiance of the express language of the statute [sub-
section (c)] and of the Senate and House Judiciary Committee Reports, which specifi-
cally declared that the definition of "labor dispute" was intended to "include others than
the immediate disputants." See Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers' Local Union,
6 F. Supp. 164 (E. D. Mich. 1934). The Circuit Court in the Rice case had found
that even if the Norris-LaGuardia Act did apply, its terms had been complied with by
the plaintiff and the injunction issued restrained only acts and threats of violence. This
ground of the opinion perhaps explains the denial of cecriorari.
Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 82 F. (2d) 68 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), in which the
court reaffirmed its rule enunciated in the Rice case by refusing to apply the statute
and enjoining picketing of the plaintiff's premises because there was no strike in pro-
gress and none of the plaintiff's employees had joined the union.
Scavenger Service Corp. v. Courtney, 85 F. (2d) 825 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), in which
the court enjoined the picketing of buildings serviced by a scavenger who did not
employ union labor. The District Court ruled that the statute applied and refused to
enjoin the picketing, which it found was carried on because the scavenger did not
employ union men. The Circuit Court, however, found that the purpose of the picket-
ing was to induce the employer not to undercut prices charged by members of the
scavenger's association and relied upon the Lauf and Rice cases for the conclusion that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act was inapplicable.
These cases are criticized in recent comments: Judicial Ntllifications of Anti-In-
junction Acts (1936), 4 I. J. A. Bu.L. No. 11, p. 1; Two Wisconsin Decisions on the
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have held that no labor dispute exists unless there is an employer-em-
ployee relation between the disputants. Several District Court judges
have adopted this view and have enjoined picketing by a union seeking
to organize the employees of a plant." A Washington District Court
has ruled that teamsters who refuse to handle beer transported by non-
union truckmen in a campaign to secure closed shop contracts with
brewers are not engaged in a labor dispute with the brewers. These
decisions are contrary to the express language of the statute that the
term "labor dispute" includes any "controversy . . . concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating . . . changing,
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee."88 The rulings violate the purpose of the enactment, as
expressed in the Senate and House Committee Reports, to overrule cases
which granted injunctions against union activities because the disputants
did not stand in the relation of employer and employee."' Other courts
have shown less of a tendency to consign the Norris-LaGuardia Act to
the fate which the Clayton Act met by "interpretation," namely, that its
purpose was merely to restate existing law.0" A Georgia District Court
has held that in a contest between two unions to win recognition by the
employer, there is a "labor dispute,"'" and a number of District Courts
have rejected the view of the Seventh Circuit by ruling that the statute
protects a union picketing an employer to unionize his plantY2  The
Anti-Injnction Act (1936), 5 Id. at 59; (1936) Anti-Injunction--A Further Note, 5 Id.
at 113.
87. Donnelly Garment Co. v. Int'l Ladies Garment Workers Union, C. C. H. Labor
Law. Serv. IT 18,012 (1937); Colonial Baking Co. v. Hatenbach, id, at 916,400 (1934);
cf. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., id. at 11 16,400 (1937); California
State Brewers Institute v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, id. at V 18,030 (1937).
88. 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 113(c) (1936).
89. See Committee Reports, note 77, supra. These reports declare that one of the
purposes of the measure was to correct the law as declared in Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921) and American Steel Foundries Co. v. Tri-City
Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921), which held that benefits of the Clayton
Act extended only to persons occupying the relation of employer and employee.
90. See American Steel Foundries Co. v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257
U. S. 184 (1921).
91. Cole v. Atlanta Terminal Co., 15 F. Supp. 131 (N. D. Ga. 1936).
92. .Miller Parlor Furniture Co. v. Furniture Workers Industrial Union, 8 F. Stipp.
209 (D. C. N. J., 1934); see Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers Local, 6 F. Supp.
164 (E. D. Mich. 1934). Other cases holding that a case grows out of a labor dispute
even though none of plaintiff's employees are members of the defendant union. Dean
v. Mayo, 8 F. Supp. 73 (W. D. La. 1934), injunction granted after bill amended, 9 F.
Supp. 459 (W. D. La. 1934), aff'd sub. nomine, Mayo v. Dean, 82 F. (2d) 554, (C. C. A.
5th, 1936); S. S. Kresge Co. v. Amster, C. C. H. Labor Law, 1 16,393 (1937). Where
the issue is union recognition and one of the unions is a company union a labor dispute
exists. U. S. v. Weirton Steel Co., 7 F. Supp. 255 (Del. 1934); Virginian Railway v.
System Fed. No. 40, 84 F. (2d) 641 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936), aff'd on other grounds, 300
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denial of certiorari in the Levering & Garrigues Co. case, coupled with
the recent sympathetic treatment by the Supreme Court of the United
States of state anti-injunction legislation, 3 gives grounds for believing
that the Supreme Court is likely to follow the lead of the Second Circuit,
in giving effect to the broad definition of "labor dispute" contained in
the statute.
Under state statutes modelled after the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the
Supreme Courts of Wisconsin and of Oregon have held that a union
seeking to organize a plant may not be enjoined from picketing the
employer's premises, even though none of plaintiff's employees is a
member of the union,94 since a labor dispute exists. In the Goldfinger
case the New York Court of Appeals adopted the view that a retailer
of meat products is engaged in the same industry as the manufacturer
of meat products and held the statute applicable." This result recog-
nizes the interdependence and interrelation of the manufacturer and the
distributor, and treats the production and distribution of meat products
as different stages in a single industry, thus executing the expressed
purpose of the statute to overrule the narrow view of the Clayton Act
adopted by the court in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering.0 In that
case a strike had been called by the International Association of Machin-
ists at the plaintiff's factory, where printing presses were manufactured.
The machinists secured the cooperation of members of their union and
of other unions to refuse to install or repair the plaintiff's presses;
truckmen were urged not to haul the presses and strikes were called against
employers to interfere with the hauling and installation of the presses.
Customers of the plaintiff were urged not to use plaintiff's presses. The
majority of the Supreme Court held that an injunction should have been
issued restraining these activities and that the Clayton Act was inap-
plicable because it limited the issuance of injunctions only in cases where
the parties stood in the relation of employer and employee. Mr.. Justice
Brandeis dissented in an opinion concurred in by Justices Holmes and
Clarke. He declared that the conduct complained of was both lawful
at common law and subject to the protection of the Clayton Act.
"When centralization in the control of business brought its cor-
responding centralization in the organization of workingmen, new
U. S. 55 (1937) ; see generally on the definition of labor dispute, Note (1937) 50 HAUv.
L. REv. 1295.
93. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Association, 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
94. American Furniture Co. v. Intl Brotherhood of T. C. & IL of A., 263 N. IV.
250 (Wis. 1936); Wallace v. International Association, 155 Ore. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1090
(1936). This view has been adopted by Lietzinan v. Radio Broadcasting Station ,VCFL.,
282 Ill. App. 203 (1935); Restful Slipper Co. v. United Shoe & Leather Union, 116
N. 3. Eq. 521, 174 At. 543 (1934).
95. See note 46, supra.
96. 254 U. S. 443 (1921).
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facts had to be appraised. A single employer might, as in this case,
threaten the standing of the whole organization and the standards
of all its members; and when he did so, the union, in order to
protect itself, would naturally refuse to work on his materials
wherever found. When such a situation was first presented to the
courts, judges concluded that the intervention of the purchaser of
the materials established an insulation through which the direct
relationship of the employer and the workingman did not penetrate;
and the strike against the material was considered a strike against
the purchaser by unaffected third parties . . . But other courts,
with better appreciation of the facts of industry, recognized the
unity of interest throughout the union, and that, in refusing to work
on materials which threatened it, the union was only refusing to aid
in destroying itself . . . So, in the case at bar, deciding a question
of fact upon the evidence introduced and matters of common
knowledge, I should say, as the two lower courts apparently have
said, that the defendants and those from .whom they sought co-
operation have a common interest which the plaintiff threatened."9'
When Congress (and the states) used the terms "persons who are
engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct
or indirect interests therein"' in a statute designed to overrule the Duple.x
Printing Press Co. case, it obviously intended to extend the act at least
to persons who work on, deliver, repair or sell goods produced by an
"unfair" manufacturer. Accordingly, the New York Court's ruling
that a delicatessen store owner who sells the products of a meat manu-
facturer and the latter's employees are engaged in the same industry and
therefore fall within the meaning of the statute is sound.
How far are the courts likely to go in defining the scope of the statute,
beyond the cases involving strikers and retailers who handle or deal in
unfair goods? The purpose of both federal and state statutes was to
widen and not to narrow the protection given to labor. Wherever, there-
fore, prior to the passage of the act, conduct was not enjoinable, it seems
reasonably likely that the statute will be held to apply. Thus, the New
York courts will probably hold that where members of a union have a
grievance against their employer, other members of the same union who
are engaged in the same craft, although their work may be entirely
different, are in the same occupation or industry as the employer of their
aggrieved brethren and are protected by the statute.08 Where the workers
involved in the primary labor dispute are in a different occupation but
provide services for or deal with other employees, e. g., longshoremen
and truckmen, the two groups of workmen are integral parts of a single
industry for purposes of a labor dispute. 9 Where goods are manufac-
97. 254 U. S. at 482 (1921) (emphasis added).
98. See note 23, supra.
99. See note 29, supra.
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tured by one group of employees, other workers engaged in a different
occupation but who are obliged as a part of their work to utilize the
goods so produced belong to the same industry within the meaning of
the act as the employees who produce the goods.' Workers vill be
treated as belonging to the same industry as employees who deliver ma-
terials to their employer, even though the materials are not used on the
particular job upon which the workers in question are employed. 0'o No
decree could properly issue in any of these cases to enjoin strikes or
picketing or circulars urging persons not to work for the intermediate
employer.
When the issue arises as a result of a picket line in front of the inter-
mediate employer's premises, urging consumers not to buy the unfair
products or not to patronize the retailer or distributor, should the results
vary? Upon the basis of the cases discussed above, persons employed
by Goldfinger may call a strike at Goldfinger's delicatessen store because
Goldfinger sells "Ukor" meats and may establish a picket line, urging
others not to work for Goldfinger. Would the employees of W. & I.
Blumenthal, manufacturer of "Ukor" products, who are on strike for
a closed shop at the Blumenthal plant, be permitted to picket Goldfinger's
and ask that the public refuse to buy any goods from Goldfinger because
he sells "Ukor" products? If Goldfinger and the employees of W. & I.
Blumenthal are persons engaged in the same industry, there is no doubt
that the picketing is permissible. Yet, there is a strong intimation in
Judge Finch's opinion in the Goldfinger case that such picketing would
not be protected by the statute, although the issue was not involved in
that case. The court's position is an anomalous one since it expressly
holds that W. & I. Blumenthal's employees and Goldfinger are within
the same industry for purposes of determining whether pickets may
urge consumers not to buy "Ukor" products and at the same time by
dictum indicates that if the pickets asked the public to buy no goods of
any kind from Goldfinger, they would not be protected by the act. Cer-
tainly, the character of the signs carried by the pickets cannot change
their status as persons engaged in the same industry.
These views should also prevail when the picketing or circulars are
directed against an intermediate party who utilizes the services of the
unfair employer rather than his goods.1 " To illustrate by a variation
of the example suggested in an earlier portion of this discussion; if a
department store advertises in a newspaper whose employees are on
100. See note 23, supra.
101. See note 29, mpra.
102. Some of the decisions of the New York courts prior to the Goldfinger case per-
mtted such picketing. Hydrox Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Doe, 159 Alisc. 642, 289 N. Y.
Supp. 683 (Sup. Ct. 1936), afflrmed in memorandum opinion, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1013
(1937), cf. cases cited in note 29 supra.
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strike, or whose plant is being organized by a union, may the strikers or
the union picket the advertiser's store? The department store is employ-
ing the services of the newspaper. Whether the signs merely request
the consumer not to buy goods advertised in the newspaper or not to
have dealings with a store which uses an unfair newspaper as a medium
of advertising, the newspaper is an integral part of the retail selling
industry.10 3 In the same way a window cleaning contractor and an elec-
trical contractor who services Neon signs perform essential functions
in the industries which hire window cleaners and electric sign servicers."'
The employees of the newspaper, the window cleaners, and the electrical
workers have a vital interest in and.are intimately connected with the
businesses of the advertisers, stores and buildings which they service.
Just as teamsters have a unity of interest with longshoremen, which
warrants inter-craft strikes by members of the two trades, and just as
the manufacturer's employees are so bound by economic ties and physical
dealings with the distributor of the manufactured products as to permit
picketing of the distributor, so persons who perform services for various
103. This situation arose in the strike of the American Newspaper Guild against
the Brooklyn Daily Eagle. Justice Faber held that the statute applied and that no injunc-
tion could issue. Davega-City Radio, Inc. v. Randau, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 20, 1937, p. 1251,
col. 1. Justice Steinbrink ruled that there was no "labor dispute" and issued an injunc-
tion which, however, permitted picketing provided no reference was made to the plaintiff.
Mile. Reif, Inc. v. Randau, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 4, 1937, p. 1994, col. 3.
104. See window cleaning cases cited in note 49, supra. decided prior to the effective
date of the statute. The Sheet Metal Workers International Association has picketed
retailers purchasing Neon signs, the Neon Sign Corporation having refused to employ
unioq labor. The union demands that the retailer use union labor to service the signs
and in some cases has withdrawn the pickets when the retailer has agreed to this de-
mand and to buy no further unfair signs. In American Gas Stations v. Doe, 250 App.
Div. 227, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1019 (1937) the court held that no labor dispute existed
between the gas station owners, the sheet metal workers, and that they were not en-
gaged in the same industry and enjoined the picketing. In a case in which a retailer
sued, an injunction was granted by the court, which declared that no labor dispute
existed. Scharf v. Doe, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 26, 1935, p. 2077, col. 2, affirmed by the Ap-
pellate Division on April 25, 1936. In a subsequent case the Neon Sign Corporation itself
sued and the complaint was dismissed because of the failure to comply with the anti-
injunction statute. Nat. Neon Sign Co. v. Doe, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 17, 1936, p. 303, col. 4.
When the complaint was amended so as to bring in the purchaser of the sign, the com-
plaint was again dismissed because of improper joinder of parties. N.Y. L. J., Feb.
6, 1936, p. 676, col. 3. Certainly the determination of whether the picketing is within
the protection of the statute should not be affected by the nominal plaintiff, whether the
retailer or the manufacturer. In both cases the providing and servicing of the signs is
a service employed in the sale of retailers' goods and as such the employees of the
sign corporation and the retailer are within the same industry within the meaning of
the statute. These cases are discussed in the New York Anti-Injunction Law in Opera-
tion (1935) 4 I. J. A. BULL. 1 and Recent Limitations Upon the New York Anti-
Injunction Law, (1936) 5 I. J. A. BULL. 3.
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industries are engaged in those industries, and have an "interest" in them,
within the meaning of state and federal anti-injunction statutes.10
It is too early in the experience of courts, employers, and labor unions
with these statutes to be able to draw a nice line around the area of
industrial conflict covered by the enactments. Already, some courts have
indicated that they will follow the traditional method employed by courts
hostile to the extension of labor's rights and emasculate the statutes by
interpretation. But for judges who approach the legislation without pre-
dilections, it is not too much to hope that the courts will hold that in-
junctions may not be issued to restrain strikes, picketing, the distribution
of circulars and related activities, directed against any person who buys
from, sells to, renders services to, receives services from, or deals with
an- employer with whom his employees or their representatives or any
union are engaged in a dispute concerning the controversies enumerated
in the statutes, which include wages, working conditions, collective bar-
gaining, union recognition and efforts to unionize a plant. Such a view
of the statutes would eliminate the issuance of injunctions against peace-
able attempts to deprive an employer of workers, customers, or suppliers
of goods or services, whether through strikes, picketing, or circulars
directed against any person having business dealings with the initial
employer, and would be in harmony with the aims of the statute to elim-
inate the injunction from labor disputes.100
CONCLUSION
In considering the various pressures exerted by labor to win higher
wages and better working conditions or to organize union shops, we start
with the premise, now enunciated by both the courts and the legislatures,
that unionization of workers bargaining collectively with employers is
desirable. Collective bargaining is not a process of matching wits or of
105. In Grandview Dairy, Inc. v. O'Leary, 158 Misc. 791,285 N. Y. Supp. 841 (Sup.
Ct 1936), the court held that picketing by teamsters of retailers buying milk from a
dairy whose teamsters were on strike was an illegal secondary boycott and that the statute
was not intended to prevent injunctions against such boycotts. The court relied upon
Stuhuier v. Korman, 241 App. Div. 702, 269 N. Y. Supp. 783 (1934) af'd wtithout opin-
ion, 265 N. Y. 481, 190 N. E. 281 (1934), which is limited to cases involving "intimida-
tion" and "truculence" by the Goldfinger case. The Grandview Dairy case is doubtless
overruled by the Goldfinger case to the extent that it holds that picketing with banners
requesting consumers not to buy unfair milk is outside the scope of the statute.
106. Frankfurter & Greene (op. cit. .supra note 5, at 205] have well expressed the
attitude toward union pressures which a modern court should adopt in their state-
ment that:
"To count the cost of union weapons is to count the cost of free competi-
tion in industrial controversy. Without breeding other ills and, above all,
without hurting the prestige of law, that cost is not to be diminished by cur-
tailing in the name of law the most effective union tactics."
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marshalling economic data. The power of a union's argument at the
conference table depends principally upon the union's ability to exert
economic pressure upon the employer in the industrial and business arena.
Labor's weapons in industrial struggles are the strike, picketing, unfair
lists and similar appeals. The use of these instruments is held within
peaceable bounds by the courts through the ever present requirement
that the activities must be carried on without violence or fraud. There
are also limitations upon the specific goals which may be sought. In
some states no pressure may be brought to bear upon the employer to
obtain a closed shop; and the anti-trust laws stand as a barrier to all
embracing or too widespread activities of labor. 1°7
To achieve a goal not proscribed by law, how far may labor str 2ke,
picket, or organize a refusal to patronize, when carried on peaceably and
without violence or fraud? Where there is no immediate commercial
intercourse or economic interrelation between the primary object of labor's
campaign and the intermediate employer who is the object of labor's
pressure, there is no indication in the cases that the strike, picketing or
unfair lists will be permitted. Our inquiry has been confined to the nar-
rower field in which the unfair employer and the intermediate employer
are related by direct economic dealings. Within this area, the strike cases
go furthest, and in New York, the pioneer state in labor law, broad co-
operation among employees in crafts interrelated by business dealings is
permitted. Just as the development of the privilege of striking against
employers for higher wages preceded the judicial sanction of picketing,
so the legality of picketing the intermediate is finding slower but in-
creasing acceptance in the courts. The modern tendency to strip words
of their emotional aura and to attempt to consider activities with judicial
calm bids fair to speed up the recognition by the courts of the unfair
list and similar circulars. The anti-injunction statutes are a highly sig-
nificant step forward, not only in limiting injunctions in labor disputes,
but in clearing the way for acceptance by the courts of the legality of
acts which are not enjoinable. A final hopeful factor -hopeful because
the economic condition of a large part of the nation depends upon labor's
ability to organize and to use economic pressures to increase wages and
improve working conditions - is the recent intimation by the Supreme
Court in the Senn case that peaceful picketing is protected by the con-
stitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. 08
107. For illustrations of cases in which statutes exempting labor unions and workers
from prosecution for criminal conspiracy resulted in rulings that such activities could
not give rise to civil liability, see Hellerstein, loc. cit. supra note 14.
108. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Association, 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
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